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Abstract
We consider the challenge of differentially private PCA. Currently known methods
for this task either employ the computationally intensive exponential mechanism or
require an access to the covariance matrix, and therefore fail to utilize potential sparsity
of the data. The problem of designing simpler and more efficient methods for this task
has been raised as an open problem in [19].
In this paper we address this problem by employing the output perturbation mech-
anism. Despite being arguably the simplest and most straightforward technique, it
has been overlooked due to the large global sensitivity associated with publishing the
leading eigenvector. We tackle this issue by adopting a smooth sensitivity based ap-
proach, which allows us to establish differential privacy (in a worst-case manner) and
near-optimal sample complexity results under eigengap assumption. We consider both
the pure and the approximate notions of differential privacy, and demonstrate a trade-
off between privacy level and sample complexity. We conclude by suggesting how our
results can be extended to related problems.
1 Introduction
Differential Privacy has become a crucial requirement in many machine learning tasks in-
volving private data such as medical and financial records ([9, 10, 6, 4, 20]). Informally
speaking, a mechanism is said to be differentially private if one can hardly distinguish be-
tween two outputs of the algorithm corresponding to samples that differ in one entry. Since
each entry typically corresponds to records of a single person, differential privacy essen-
tially requires that the participation of a single individual in the sample (e.g. medical tests)
would not reveal its private information. This requirement inherently implies a tradeoff
between privacy and accuracy. Accordingly, considerable efforts have been made to identify
structural properties that enable us to reduce this conflict.
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a fundamental dimensionality reduction tech-
nique in machine learning and data science. Finding a low-rank approximation of a given
dataset is beneficial in terms of time and space complexity. In some scenarios (e.g. vision
tasks), it also has the benefit of noise removal.
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In view of the above, it is not surprising that differentially private PCA has received
substantial attention recently ([3, 7, 19, 16, 11]).
Our main contribution is a simple yet efficient method to make PCA differentially pri-
vate. In a nut-shell, our method modifies standard PCA algorithm by adding a post-
processing step in which a suitable noise is added to the output. Therefore, it is straight-
forward to combine it with any PCA implementation, including implementation that make
use of unique properties of the data such as sparsity. To achieve that, we show that if there
is a large eigengap between the leading eigenvalues of the covariance matrix, then the PCA
problem becomes less sensitive to changes in its inputs. Hence, we can compute the amount
of noise to inject as a function of the eigen gap.
1.1 Problem Definition
Let us now describe the considered problem formally. Let D an unknown distribution
defined on the unit ball in Rd.1 Given a low-rank parameter k P rds, our ultimate goal is to
approximately solve
min
UPU
F pUq “ ´trpUUJCq, where C :“ Ex„DrxxJs, U “ tU P Rdˆk : UJU “ Iku , (1)
while preserving differential privacy. The input to the learning algorithm A consists of a
sample S “ px1, . . . , xnq drawn i.i.d. according to D. Its output is denoted by Uˆ P U . The
sample complexity of the algorithm is a function n : p0, 1q3 Ñ N, where npǫg, ǫp, δpq is the
minimal size of an i.i.d. sample S “ px1, . . . , xnq „ Dn for which the following conditions
simultaneously hold:
ǫg-accuracy:
2with constant probability over both the draw of the sample S according to
Dn and the internal randomness of the algorithm,
F pUˆq ď min
UPU
F pUq ` ǫg .
pǫp, δpq-differential privacy: Let dpS, S1q be the minimal number of elements that should
be removed or added to the sample S1 to obtain the sample S. We say that S and S1 are
neighboring samples if dpS, S1q ď 1. We require that for all neighboring samples S, S1, and
for all U P U ,
ppApSq “ Uq ď exppǫpqppApS1q “ Uq ` δp , (2)
(where p refers to the density function). The stricter notion of “pure” differential privacy
requires also that δp “ 0.
2 Algorithms and Main Result
In this paper we focus on particularly simple and efficiency-preserving method, named
output perturbation. As its name suggests, the basic idea is to add noise to the output
1Our results can be easily scaled to balls of larger radius.
2Given a confidence parameter δ, standard techniques can be used to decrease the probability of failure
to δ while incurring only logarithmic overhead in terms of sample complexity.
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of an (approximately) exact algorithm. Arguably, this is the simplest and most flexible
method, as it can be applied to any algorithm in a black-box fashion while preserving its
efficiency. We assume an access to an algorithm A which (approximately) minimize the
empirical risk
Fˆ pUq :“ ´trpUUJCˆq, Cˆ :“ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
xix
J
i .
We also assume that the algorithm A outputs the gap between the k-th and the pk ` 1q-
th eigenvalues of Cˆ. This assumption is not restrictive, as every reasonable PCA solver
possesses this capability. Based on the output of A, our mechanism determines the noise
level. The main challenge in our work is to set the noise level so that differential privacy
holds for any sample, and high accuracy is achieved under eigengap assumption.
Before adding the noise, there is another subtle issue which should be carefully addressed.
To illustrate this challenge, consider the case k “ 1. Clearly, a unit vector u P Rd is a leading
eigenvector if and only if ´u is also a leading eigenvector. Since the sign of the vector is
arbitrary, a PCA solver might use it to leak private information, such as whether a specific
point x˚ was in the dataset ot not. Overcoming this potential risk is possible by negating
the output of the PCA solver with probability 1{2 before adding the noise. More generally,
for the case k ą 1, we will replace Uˆ by RUˆ , where R P Rdˆd is a random orthogonal matrix.
We then add the noise and perform QR decomposition to obtain the final output. A detailed
pseudocode of our method is given in Algorithm 1. To simplify the presentation and for
Algorithm 1 Differentially private PCA using Output perturbation
Parameters: ǫg, δg, ǫp, δp P p0, 1q, k P rds, PURE P tTRUE, FALSEu
Input: Uˆ :“ argminUPU ´trpUCˆq, G “ λ1pCˆq ´ λ2pCˆq
Oracle: ApSq “ pU˜ :“ argminUPU Fˆ pUq, λkpCˆq ´ λk`1pCˆqq
Draw a random orthogonal matrix R P Rdˆd
Replace Uˆ with U “ RU
if PURE “ TRUE then
Draw E :“ EPURE P Rdˆk as described in Equation (4)
else
Draw E :“ EAPPROX P Rdˆk as described in Equation (3)
end if
Return the matrix U˜ “ QRpU ` Eq.
the sake of conciseness, we focus on the case k “ 1. The case of k ą 1 is a straightforward
extension of the case k “ 1
Theorem 1 (Main theorem: approximate case) Given that PURE “ FALSE, Algo-
rithm 1 is pǫp, δpq-differentially private. Furthermore, if GAPpDq :“ λ1pErxxJsq´λ2pErxxJsq ą
0, then its sample complexity is at most3
npǫg, ǫp, δpq “ O˜
˜ ?
d
GAPpDqǫpǫg
¸
3We use the O˜ notation to hide logarithmic dependencies.
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Theorem 2 (Main theorem: pure case) Given that PURE “ TRUE, Algorithm 1 is ǫp-
differentially private. Furthermore, if GAPpDq :“ λ1pErxxJsq ´ λ2pErxxJsq ą 0, then its
sample complexity is at most
npǫg, ǫpq “ O˜
˜
d3{2
GAPpDqǫpǫg
¸
3 Related Work
Differentially private PCA has been extensively investigated in [7, 16, 19, 3, 11, 15]. The
lower bound of [11] implies that our sample complexity for the approximate case (see The-
orem 1) is optimal up to logarithmic factors. For the pure case, the lower bound given by
[7] scales with d, whereas our upper bound (see Theorem 2) scales with d3{2.
The first proposed method for differential private PCA was Sub-Linear Queries (SULQ)
([3]). It employs the general strategy of input perturbation by adding random Gaussian noise
to the empirical covariance matrix. Both the algorithm and its analysis have been refined
recently by [11]. Restating their results within our framework gives approximate differential
privacy with sample complexity bound identical to Theorem 1. They also consider the gap-
free scenario. As we mentioned previously, the main limitation of this method is that it
requires an access to the covariance matrix, which might be too costly in terms of space
and time. Many fast PCA implementations (e.g. [23, 13, 8, 17, 18]) avoid working with the
covariance matrix and consequently utilize potential sparsity of the data. As we mentioned
previously, our output perturbation can be combined with any of these methods.
Another approach that has been investigated in [7, 19] is to use the exponential mecha-
nism ([10]). While this approach achieves pure differential with optimal sample complexity
(also in the gap-free case), the only theoretically analyzed implementation of the associated
sampling method runs in time Opd6q.
Besides the spectral gap assumption, another common approach is to assume some
form of incoherence. This route has been taken by [16, 15] who provide several interesting
differentially private methods for PCA.
4 Analysis
In this section we prove our main result. We start by defining the local and global sensitivity
of PCA, and proceed to define and analyze the smooth sensitivity.
4.1 Local and Global Sensitivity up To Equivalence
In the context of output perturbation, the sensitivity of a sample is defined as the maximum
distance between two outputs of PCA corresponding to the neighboring samples. Unless
specified otherwise, the distance is measured according to the ℓ2-norm. Due to the equiva-
lence between outputs discussed above, it makes sense to define the notion of distance be-
tween equivalent solutions. Namely, for any U P U , we define rU s “ tRU : R P Rd, RJR “
Idu. The distance between rU s and rV s is defined by }rU s ´ rV s} “ mint}U 1 ´ V 1} : U 1 P
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rU s, V 1 P rV su. Since our algorithm replaces the output U of PCA by RUˆ , where R is a
random orthogonal matrix, this modification does not harm our analysis.
Definition 1 (Global and local sensitivity) The ℓ2-local sensitivity of a PCA algorithm
A : X n Ñ U w.r.t. a sample S “ px1, . . . , xnq is defined as
LSpSq :“ LSApSq “ max
S1:dpS,S1qď1
}rApSqs ´ rApS1qs} .
The global sensitivity of A is defined as suptLSpSq : S P supppDnqu. The ℓ1-local sensitivity
is defined analogously.
It is known that adding noise proportional to the global sensitivity (using a suitable noise
distribution depending on the privacy parameters) yields differential privacy ([11]). The
following example due to [7] illustrates the difficulty in preserving both accuracy and privacy
using this approach. Let u, u1 P Rd be two orthonormal vectors and consider two samples
S and S1, where S consists of n ` 1 copies of u and n copies of u1, whereas S1 consists of
n` 1 copies of u1 and n copies of u. The leading eigenvectors associated with S and S1 are
u and u1, respectively. To satisfy differential privacy in this case, one should inject a noise
proportional to the distance between u and u1. In particular, the amount of noise does not
decreases as a function of the sample size, hence accuracy can not be preserved.
An easy computation shows that the eigengap in the previous examples scales inversely
with the sample size. The following theorem shows that the larger the eigengap the smaller
is the local sensitivity. We first make the following definition.
Definition 2 Given a sample S “ px1, . . . , xnq, we denote the eigengap between the two
leading eigenvalues of the empirical covariance matrix 1
n
řn
i“1 xix
J
i by GAPpSq.
Theorem 3 Let S “ px1, . . . , xnq P supppDnq be a sample and suppose GAPpSq ą 0. Then
there exists a global constant C ą 0 such that the ℓ2-sensitivity of PCA is at most 3Cn¨GAPpSq .
Furthermore, the global ℓ2-sensitivity is
?
2. The ℓ1-local sensitivity is at most
?
d times
larger than the ℓ2-local sensitivity, and the ℓ1-global sensitivity is at most 2.
This result can be proved in several ways. The approach taken here exploits recent results
on strict saddle problems, which include PCA as a special case.
Proof Let S “ px1, . . . , xnq P supppDnq and S1 “ px1, . . . , xn´1q P supppDn´1q be two
neighboring samples and let u, u1 be the minimizers of the corresponding empirical risks.
Denote by Cˆ “ n´1řni“1 xixJi and Cˆ 1 “ n´1řni“1 xixJi . By KKT conditions ([5]), there
exist λ :“ λpuq and λ1 “ λpu1q such that,
u “ argmin
vPRd
´vJCv ` λp}v}2 ´ 1qlooooooooooooomooooooooooooon
“:Lˆpvq
, u1 “ argmin
vPRd
´vJCˆ 1v ` λ1p}v}2 ´ 1qlooooooooooooomooooooooooooon
“:Lˆ1pvq
Also, λ and λ1 admit the closed forms:
λ “ uJCˆu, λ1 “ u1JCˆ 1u1 .
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That is, λ is the leading eigenvalue of Cˆ and λ1 is the leading eigenvalue of Cˆ 1. By first-order
conditions, both ∇Lˆpuq “ 0 and ∇Lˆ1pu1q “ 0. Also,
∇Lˆpu1q “ ´Cˆu1`λu1 “ n´ 1
n
∇Lˆ1pu1q´n´1xnxJnu´
n´ 1
n
λ1u1`λu1 “ n´1xnxJnu´pλ1´λqu`n´1λ1u1
Since }xi} ď 1 for all i, by using Weyl’s inequality we obtain that }∇Lˆpu1q} ď 3n .
We next use the strict saddle property of PCA to bound the distance between u and u1.
Concretely, it is shown in [14] that our formulation of PCA is pα, γ, τq-strict saddle with
α, γ, τ “ C´1GAPpSq for some constant C ą 0 (see [14]). Theorem 5 in this paper implies
that if n “ Ωp1{G2q, then u1 lies in a C´1GAPpSq-strongly convex region (of the objective
Fˆ ) around the minimizer u. By strong convexity (see [21]),
∇Lˆpu1qJpu´ u1q “ p∇Lˆpu1q ´∇LˆpuqqJpu´ u1q ě C´1GAPpSq}u´ u1}2 .
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain that
}∇Lˆpu1q} }u´ u1} ě C´1GAPpSq}u´ u1}2 ñ }u´ u1} ď C
GAPpSq}∇Lˆpu
1q} ď 3C
nGAPpSq .
The bound on the ℓ2-local sensitivity follows immediately. The bound on the ℓ1-local sen-
sitivity follows from the fact that the ℓ1-distance is at most
?
d larger than the ℓ2-distance.
The bounds on the global sensitivity are simply the ℓ2 and the ℓ1 distances between two
perpendicular unit vectors.
It is tempting to replace the global sensitivity with the local one in hope of ensuring dif-
ferential privacy in a worst case manner and achieving high accuracy under the common
eigengap assumption. In general, this approach is problematic since the local sensitivity
itself might be sensitive.4 This brings us to the notion of smooth sensitivity, which we
describe in the next part.
4.2 Background on Smooth sensitivity
Originated in ([22]), the notion of smooth sensitivity provides a systematic framework for
generating insensitive surrogate for the local sensitivity. It consists of two main ingredients:
a) Finding a suitable smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity. b) Generating noise
according to an admissible distribution scaled by the smooth upper bound.
Definition 3 (smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity ([22])) For β ą 0, a
function SU :
Ť
nPN supppDnq Ñ Rě0 is a β-smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity LS
if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. SUpSq ě LSpSq for every sample S
4The following example due to [10] illustrates this idea. Suppose that we would like to compute the
median of a given sequence in a differential private manner. Let S be a sample consisting of n{2 ` 1 zeros
and n{2 elements of magnitude at least 106. Assuming that we break ties in favor of the smaller value, the
local sensitivity of S is zero. On the other hand, by removing a single zero element from S, we obtain a
neighboring sample whose local sensitivity is at least 106.
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2. For every two neighboring samples S, S1,
expp´βqSUpS1q ď SUpSq ď exppβqSUpS1q .
The following characterization of the smooth sensitivity is often useful.
Definition 4 Let LS be any point-wise upper bound on the local sensitivity. For a sample
S and k P N, we define
ApkqpSq “ max
S1: dpS,S1qďk
LSpS1q .
Lemma 1 ([22][Claim 3.2]) Let LS be any point-wise upper bound on the local sensitivity
and define ApkqpSq as above. The function U : ŤnPN supppDnq Ñ R defined by
UpSq “ max
kPrns
expp´βkqApkqpSq
is a β-smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity.
Analogously to the global sensitivity, the smooth local sensitivity determines the scale of the
noise associated with our perturbed output. However, due to the change in the sensitivity
level, the privacy guarantees are slightly worse than the standard case. For example, as
explained in [22], drawing the noise according to any sub-gaussian distribution can not yield
pure differential privacy. If one insists on obtaining pure differential privacy, more heavy-
tailed distributions such as Cauchy distribution should be used. We discuss one non-pure
(and less noisy) and one pure (and more noisy) possibilities.
Theorem 4 ([22][Lemmas 2.7 and 2.10])
Let ǫp, δp P p0, 1q be the differential privacy parameters. The following claims hold:
1. Gaussian noise: Suppose that UpSq is a β-smooth upper bound on the local sensi-
tivity, where β “ ǫp
4pd`lnp2{δpqq . Define the noise matrix in Algorithm 1 by
EAPPROX “ 5UpSq ¨
a
2 lnp2{δq
ǫp
Z ,
where Z is a standard d-dimensional Gaussian random variable. Then Algorithm 1 is
pǫp, δpq-differentially private.
2. Cauchy noise: Suppose that UpSq is a β-smooth upper bound on the ℓ1-local sen-
sitivity, where β “ ǫp
6d
. Define the noise matrix in Algorithm 1 by
EPURE “ 6UpSq
ǫp
Z ,
where Z1, . . . , Zd are drawn i.i.d. according to the density function fpzq “ 1πp1`z2q , is
ǫp-differentially private.
Remark 1 Lemmas 2.7 and 2.10 in [22] refer to the noisy output Uˆ before the QR step.
However, since differential privacy is immune to post-processing ([10]), the claim holds for
the output U˜ as well.
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4.3 Smooth Sensitivity of PCA
In this part we bound the smooth sensitivity of PCA and establish the privacy properties
of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 2 Let S “ px1, . . . , xnq be a sample of size n and suppose that GAPpSq ą 0. For
any sample S1 “ pz1, . . . , zmq with dpS, S1q ď k, we have that
maxt0, n ¨ GAPpSq ´ ku ď m ¨ GAPpS1q ď n ¨ GAPpSq ` k .
Furthermore, for each side of the above inequality, there exists a sample S1 with dpS, S1q “ k
for which the inequality holds with equality.
Proof Let H “ řni“1 xixJi , M “ řmi“1 zizJi and denote by P “ H ´M . Using Weyl’s
inequality ([1][Section 3.2]), we obtain that
λ1pMq ě λ1pHq ` λdpP q, λ2pMq ď λ2pHq ` λ1pP q
Since the ℓ2-norm of the xi’s (similarly, the zi’s) is at most 1 and dpS, S1q ď k, both the
rank and the trace-norm of P are at most k.5Therefore,
λ1pMq ´ λ2pMq ě λ1pHq ´ λ2pHq ` λdpP q ´ λ1pP q
ě λ1pHq ´ λ2pHq ´
dÿ
i“1
|λipP q|
ě λ1pHq ´ λ2pHq ´ k .
This concludes the inequality. Letting u2 be the second leading eigenvector of H, the right
side of the inequality is attained by setting S1 “ S ` řki“1 u2. The left side is attained
analogously.
Combining the last lemma with Theorem 3, Lemma 1 and Theorem 4, we conclude that
Algorithm 1 is differentially private.
Corollary 1 (Approximate differential privacy) Suppose that PURE “ FALSE and let
EPURE “
5maxkPrns expp´βkqApkqpSq ¨
a
2 lnp2{δq
ǫp
Z , (3)
where Z is standard d-dimensional Gaussian random variable and
ApkqpSq “
#
C
n¨GAPpSq´k n ¨ GAPpSq ´ k ą 0?
2 otherwise
Then Algorithm 1 is pǫp, δpq-differentially private.
5The trace norm of P is
ř
d
i“1
|λipP q|. Since P is the sum of k rank-1 matrices of trace 1, it follows using
the triangle inequality that the trace norm of P is at most k.
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Corollary 2 (Pure differential privacy) Suppose that PURE “ TRUE and let
EPURE “
6maxkPrns expp´βkqApkqpSq
ǫp
Z , (4)
where Z1, . . . , Zd are i.i.d. Cauchy random variables and
ApkqpSq “
#
C
?
d
n¨GAPpSq´k n ¨ GAPpSq ´ k ą 0
2 otherwise
Then Algorithm 1 is ǫp-differentially private.
4.4 Near-optimal accuracy under eigengap assumption
In this part we complete the proof of our main result by bounding the smooth sensitivity
under the eigengap assumption. We start by relating the distributional gap assumption
to the empirical eigengap. The following lemma follows from Matrix Bernstein inequality
([24]).
Lemma 3 Suppose that GAPpDq :“ λ1pErxxJsq ´ λ2pErxxJsq ą 0. If n “ Ω
´
logpdq
GAPpDq2
¯
,
then with probability at least 1´δ{2 over the draw of a sample S according to Dn, GAPpSq ě
GAPpDq{2.
The next two lemma refer to the ℓ1 and the ℓ2 cases, respectively.
Lemma 4 Let ǫp, δp, ǫg P p0, 1q, and let S “ px1, . . . , xnq P supppDnq be a sample with
GAPpSq ą 0. Define ApkqpSq as in Corollary 1 and let β “ ǫp
4pd`lnp2{δpqq . Suppose that
n ě 2C
?
d
GAPpSqǫpǫg `
8pd` lnp2{δpqq lnp
?
2d{pǫpǫgqq
GAPpSqǫp .
Then
UpSq :“ max
kPN
expp´βkqApkqpSq ď ǫgǫp{
?
d
Proof Assume first that k ď n¨GAPpSq
2
. In particular, this implies that n ¨GAPpSq´k ą 0.
Using that n ě 2C
?
d
GAPpSqǫpǫg , it follows that
UpSq :“ expp´βkqApkqpSq ď ApkqpSq “ C
n ¨ GAPpSq ´ k
ď 2C
n ¨ GAPpSq ď ǫgǫp{
?
d .
Assume now that k ą n¨GAPpSq
2
, so expp´βkq ď exp
´
´βn¨GAPpSq
2
¯
. Using that n ě
8pd`lnp2{δpqq lnp
?
2d{pǫpǫgqq
GAPpSqǫp , we obtain that expp´βkq ď ǫgǫp{p
?
2dq Since Apkq ď ?2 for all
S and k,
expp´βkqApkqpSq ď ǫgǫp{
?
d .
We proceed to the ℓ1-case.
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Lemma 5 Let ǫp, ǫg P p0, 1q and let S “ px1, . . . , xnq P supppDnq be a sample with GAPpSq ą
0. Define ApkqpSq as in Corollary 2 and let β “ ǫp
6d
. Suppose that
n ě 2Cd
3{2
GAPpSqǫpǫg `
6d lnp2d{pǫpǫgqq
GAPpSqǫp .
Then
UpSq :“ max
kPN
expp´βkqApkqpSq ď ǫgǫp{d .
We finally conclude our main result.
Proof (of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) The differential privacy of the algorithm was
established in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2. We next prove the bounds on the sample
complexity. All the bounds given below hold with constant probability.
In view of Lemma 3, we may assume that GAPpSq is of order GAPpDq. Sample com-
plexity bounds for PCA ([14, 2]) show that for n “ Ω
´
1
GAPpDqǫg
¯
, the true risk of any
unit vector is ǫg{4-close to its empirical risk. Therefore, adopting the notation used in
Algorithm 1, F puˆq ď minF puq ` ǫg{2. It is left to show that
Fˆ pu˜q ´ Fˆ puˆq ď ǫg{2 .
For the case k “ 1, the QR decomposition step amounts to normalizing the noisy vector u.
Therefore, it suffices to show bound the ℓ2 norm of the noise vector u ´ uˆ by ǫg. For ap-
proximate differential privacy, standard concentration bounds give a bound of order
?
d on
the ℓ2 norm of a standard d-dimensional Gaussian vector. Using Lemma 4, we conclude the
bound. For the pure setting, it is known that the median of the absolute value of a Cauchy
random variable is 1. Since the Cauchy distribution is 1-stable, the sum of d i.i.d. Cauchy
random variables is also a standard Cauchy random variable scaled by d. Consequently,
the ℓ1 and the ℓ2 norms of the corresponding vector can be bounded by d (with constant
probability). The desired bound follows from Lemma 5.
5 Discussion
In this work we studied the problem of adding privacy properties to the commonly used
PCA algorithm. We showed that we can add privacy as a post processing step to any PCA
solver while maintaining good accuracy. Moreover, the post processing step is efficient and
preserves the utility of the PCA algorithm. This is a significant improvement over previous
results that are either not computationally efficient or otherwise require changes to the
implementations of PCA solvers.
We believe that some of the techniques used in our paper may be beneficial for other
related problems. For example, our approach can be applied to any strict saddle problem for
which we are able to compute the expression ApkqpSq which controls the smooth sensitivity.
Furthermore, our technique for overcoming symmetry between equivalent solutions can be
applied to most known strict saddle problems such as low rank problems whose minima are
unique up to rotation ([12]).
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